The only fault we can fairly lay at Lucas' and Penrose's doors, for continuing to believe in the essential soundness of the Gödelian argument, is their naïve faith in, first, non-verifiable assertions in standard expositions of classical theory, and, second, in Gödel's unvalidated interpretation of his own formal reasoning. We show why their faith is misplaced in both instances.
Introduction
Although most reasoned critiques (such as, for instance, [Bo90] , [Br00] , [Da93] , [Fe96] , [La98] , [Le69] , [Le89] , [Pu95] ) of Lucas' and Penrose's arguments against computationalism are unassailable, they do not satisfactorily explain why Lucas and Penrose -reasonable men, both -remain convinced of the essential soundness of their own arguments ( [Lu96] , [Pe96] ). 1 The author is an independent scholar. E-mail: re@alixcomsi.com; anandb@vsnl.com. A less technically critical review of their arguments is, indeed, necessary to appreciate the reasonability of their belief. It stems from the fact that, on the one hand, Lucas and Penrose have, unquestioningly, put faith in, and followed, standard expositions of classical theory in overlooking what Gödel has actually proven in Theorem VI ( [Go31] , p24) of his seminal 1931 paper [Go31] on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions; on the other, they have, similarly, put faith in, and uncritically accepted as definitive, Gödel's own, informal and unvalidated, interpretation of the implications of this Theorem ( [Go31] , p27).
They should not be taken to task on either count for their faith; it is standard expositions of Gödel's reasoning that remain ambiguously silent on both issues.
In this paper, we show that such ambiguity and silence has been, and continues to be, both, misleading and unnecessary. We show, specifically, that in [Go31] , Gödel hasalbeit implicitly 2 , and perhaps unwittingly and unknowingly -defined the logical satisfaction and logical truth of the formulas of an Arithmetic, the logical soundness of the Arithmetic itself, and the logical completeness of the Arithmetic, in an effective and verifiable manner within the Arithmetic.
Why the definitions have not been explicitly recognised by, both, Gödel (at least in [Go65] ), and standard expositions of his reasoning (such as, for instance, [Be59] , [Bo03] , [Ch98] , [Da93] , [Fe96] , [Me64] , [R087], [Ro36] , [Ro39] , [Sh67] , [Sm92] , [Wa64] ) is a mystery.
The question we need to ask is, however: How differently would we have viewed
Gödel's reasoning, and its consequences, had Gödel defined logical satisfiability, logical truth, logical soundness and logical completeness explicitly as below.
Can verifiable logical truth be formalised in Peano Arithmetic?
Now, standard expositions of Tarski's Theorem [Ta36] -to the effect that the set of However, the crucial point provable by Gödel's reasoning in [Go31] , but one whose significance has been overlooked, both, by him as well as by standard expositions of his reasoning, is that such a conclusion is not just arguable -it is false. 3 We define the "standard interpretation" of first-order Peano Arithmetic, PA, as (cf. [Me64] , p107):
"... the interpretation in which (a) the set of non-negative integers is the domain, (b) the integer 0 is the interpretation of the symbol 0, (c) the successor operation (addition of 1) is the interpretation of the ' function (i.e., of f 1 1 ), (d) ordinary addition and multiplication are the interpretations of + and ., (e) the interpretation of the predicate letter = is the identity relation."
In other words, the interpreted, arithmetical, relation R(x) is obtained from the formula [R(x)] of PA by replacing every primitive, undefined, symbol of PA in the formula [R(x)] by an intuitively interpreted mathematical symbol (i.e. a symbol that is a shorthand notation for some, semantically well-defined, concept of classical mathematics) as in (a)-(e).
Tarski's definitions of satisfiability and truth
Now, the standard definitions of the satisfiability, and truth, of the formulas of a formal language, say L, under a well-defined interpretation 5 , say M, are due to Tarski [Ta36] .
Thus, a formula We note that the interpreted arithmetical relation, R(x), in the standard model M of a Peano arithmetic, P, is obtained from the formula [R(x)] of the formal system P by replacing every primitive, undefined symbol of P in the formula [R(x)] by an interpreted mathematical symbol (i.e. a symbol that is a shorthand notation for some, semantically well-defined, concept of classical mathematics). So the P-formula [(Ax)R(x)] interprets as the sentence (Ax)R(x), and the P-formula [~(Ax)R(x)] as the sentence ~(Ax)R(x).
We also note that the meta-assertions "[(Ax)R(x)] is a true sentence under the interpretation M of P", and "(Ax)R(x) is a true sentence of the interpretation M of P", are equivalent to the meta-assertion "R(x) is satisfied for any given value of x in the domain of the interpretation M of P" ([Me64], p51). 6 We use square brackets to indicate that the expression within the brackets is to be treated as a syntactic string of formal symbols only, devoid of any semantic content. 
Definition of verifiable logical satisfaction and logical truth
However, if we take M to be an interpretation of L in L itself, then we have the, 
Definition of verifiable logical soundness
If we, further, define logical soundness as the property that the axioms of a theory are satisfied in the theory itself, and that the rules of inference preserve logical truth, then, it follows that the theorems of any logically sound theory are logically true in the theory.
It is straightforward to verify that first-order Peano Arithmetic is, indeed, logically sound. So, Gödel has actually constructed a formally unprovable Arithmetical formula that is not only intuitively true in the standard, intuitive, interpretation of the Arithmetic, but which is also logically true in the Arithmetic in a verifiable, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, manner that leaves no room for dispute as to its 'truth' status.
Gödelian propositions
Moreover, since the Arithmetic can be shown to be logically sound -again in a verifiable, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, manner -standard expositions of Gödel's meta-9 Although Gödel's arguments were developed in an explicitly defined formal system P of Arithmetic based on Dedekind's formulation of the Peano Axioms, they hold also for standard first-order Peano Arithmetic. Surely Lucas and Penrose should not be faulted for treating this as a necessary, and definitive, omission, and for continuing to believe in the essential soundness of the Platonic, individual, intuitive interpretations and consequences of their own reasoning! 10 "The system F is said to be sound for a class S of sentences if whenever F proves phi with phi in S then phi is true in the structure N of natural numbers" [Fe96] . 
There are no non-trivial non-standard models of first order Peano Arithmetic

Conclusions
What we have highlighted, above, is that the Gödelian argument draws sustenance from the fact that standard expositions of Gödel's reasoning appeal to the intuitive satisfaction and intuitive truth of the formulas of Peano Arithmetic, and the intuitive soundness of the Arithmetic, under an intuitive (hence arguable) standard interpretation; the concepts are not defined explicitly in an effectively verifiable manner.
We have shown that this ambiguous appeal, however, is easily avoided by using Gödel 
A.2 We use the term 'exists' ambiguously
The deeper issue here seems to be that, when using language to express the abstract objects (elements) of our individual, and common, mental 'concept spaces', we use the word 'exists' loosely in three senses, without making explicit distinctions between them. Clearly, the debatable issue is the third case.
A.3 Can we correlate diverse, individually conceivable, interpretations unambiguously?
So the question is whether we can -and, if so, how we may -correspond the, Platonically conceivable, objects of various individual interpretations of L, say M, M', M'', ..., unambiguously to the mathematical objects that are definable as the constant terms of L.
If we can achieve this, we can, then, attempt to relate L to a common external world, and try to communicate effectively about our individual mental concepts of the world that we accept as lying, by consensus, in a common, Platonic, 'concept space'.
A.4 The central role of the standard interpretation of first-order Peano Arithmetic
For mathematical languages, such an intuitionistically unobjectionable, common, However, curiously, even Computability Theory is reluctant to note that these Theses do not succeed in their objective completely.
Thus, even if we accept the standard formulations of the Theses, we still cannot conclude that we have specified explicitly that the domain of M consists of only constructive mathematical objects that can be represented in the most basic of our formal mathematical languages, namely, first-order Peano Arithmetic and Recursive Arithmetic.
A.6 The standard formulation of CT violates the principle of Occam's razor
The reason seems to be that the Church and Turing Theses -CT for short -are postulated as strong identities 14 , which, prima facie, go beyond the minimum requirements for the correspondence between the, Platonically conceivable, mathematical objects of M and those of PA and Recursive Arithmetic. It is the tacit acceptance of this implicit implication that prevents, for instance, a
constructive definition of what we are individually able to conceive as a random real number -one whose digits are instantiationally computable effectively, but which are not computable algorithmically (such as, for instance, Chaitin's Omegas, assuming that they are, indeed, well-defined real numbers).
A.8 We can define arithmetical truth effectively
Now, such implicit implication can be avoided by explicitly recognising that there are well-defined mathematically expressible functions (and relations) which can, intuitively, be termed as effectively computable / decidable instantiationally (i.e., in any given instance, by some mechanical method that depends on the given instance), even though they are not computable / decidable algorithmically (i.e., by a common mechanical method that applies to every given instance).
Recognition of this immediately allows us to define logical truth effectively (at least for It also implies that there are no non-trivial, non-standard, models of Peano Arithmetic, an immediate corollary of which is that P ≠ NP (Appendix B).
However, a more interesting benefit of weakening the Church and Turing Theses is that they, then, provide the equivalent instantiational, arithmetical, completeness -in firstorder theory -that is provided in second-order Peano Arithmetic (which formalises our concepts of the natural numbers as expressed by Dedekind's Peano Postulates) by the second-order Induction Axiom.
Such completeness would be of significance to the computational thesis -which Lucas and Penrose attempt to refute by the Gödelian argument -that all 'mathematics' is precisely captured by 'computation'. 16 The author develops this argument further in various arXived, but unpublished, papers. If we assume, first, the thesis that every total arithmetical relation that is Turingdecidable as TRUE is PA-provable, then R(x) is not Turing-decidable as TRUE, and, so, P ≠ NP.
If we assume, however, that there is a total arithmetical relation that is Turing-decidable as TRUE, but which is not PA-provable, then this implies that there is a consistent, nontrivial, non-standard, model of PA, in which [R(s)] is satisfied for some term [s] of the interpretation that is not a natural number.
We conclude that, if PA has no consistent, non-trivial, non-standard models, then, under the above expression of the PvNP problem, P ≠ NP.
